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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and appellee, 
-vs-
NEALY W. ADAMS, 
Defendant and appellant. 
Case No. 960092-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction by jury of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second 
degree felony in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, the Honorable 
Stanton M. Taylor, Presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of 
Sections77-18a-l(l)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE (1) Was there prejudicial prosecutor misconduct by using voir dire of 
an expert witness to attempt to embarrass him and make unfounded accusations 
against him that he made no attempt to support with evidence. The standard of review 
is prejudicial error and objections were made at (Tr. Vol. 2 P.200 & 206) , also see 
State v Babich 842 P.2d 1053 (Wash. App. 1993) 
ISSUE 2: Was the testimony of the alleged victim sufficient to support the 
verdict. Standard of review: Could reasonable minds doubt that the defendant 
committed the offense. State v. Hamilton 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992). Motion to 
dismiss was made and denied at the end of the States case in chief. 
ISSUE 3: Did the trial court commit error in not granting defendants motion 
to dismiss at the end of the States case in chief? Motion to dismiss was made at the 
end of the States case in chief. Standard of review: a) Was there a prima facie case at 
that point; b) was the evidence legally sufficient. State v Smith 675 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1983) and Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUE 4: Did the court commit error in denying the defense the right to 
pursue a witness's prior conduct with extrinsic evidence under Rule 608 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The defendant attempted to do this but was denied the right to by 
court order of Page 181 of Vol.2 of the trial transcript. See State v. Hackford 737 
P.2d 200. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course and Disposition Below 
The defendant was originally charged with Forcible Sexual Abuse, a Second 
Degree Felony and with Forcible Sodomy a First Degree Felony. At preliminary 
hearing the Court permitted the State to amend the Forcible Sodomy charge to that of 
Rape, a First Degree Felony. At the conclusion of a three day jury trial the jury found 
the defendant Not-Guilty of Rape but found him Guilty of Forcible Sexual Abuse, the 
Second Degree Felony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
General 
The defendant became acquainted with Verla Hess, the mother of Carleen 
Hess, in August of 1993. He moved in with Verla and Carleen about a month later 
and continued to live there until April 25th, 1995. (Tr. 42) (Tr.52-53). On April 29th 
Verla Hess made a complaint to the South Ogden police alleging the defendant had 
been sexually involved with her daughter Carleen. On May 2nd, 1995 the defendant 
was confronted by the police and arrested. (R-004) 
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Although the State does not contend that Carleen attempted to physically resist 
the defendant they do content that she is incapable of consenting because of her mental 
deficiencies. Carleen is 35 years old but was born with Down's syndrome (Tr. 38) 
and does not function with sufficient mental capacity to legally consent. The 
defendant denied any sexual involvement with Carleen. (Tr. Vol. 3 P.23) 
Dr. Larry Orme Smithing was called as a defense witness. Dr. Smithing 
testified that he examined Carleen on the 3rd of May, 1995, and did not find any 
evidence of that she had been sexually assaulted. He also stated that Carleen did not 
make any statement to him that she had been sexually assaulted.(Tr. V.2 P.6) 
The defendant contended that the only explanation he had for Carleen's 
allegations was that she was instructed to do so by her mother. The defendant further 
contended that the mother, Verla Hess, was very angry and vindictive towards him for 
leaving her. 
Statement of Facts 
Prosecutor misconduct 
The defense called John Duane Moyes as an expert witness to testify 
concerning certain documents, and the person who wrote them or typed them. The 
defense had him testify as to his background to qualify him as an expert.(Tr. Vol. 2 
P. 189-196). The prosecution then asked to voir dire concerning his qualifications.(Tr. 
Vol 2 P. 196). 
The prosecutor was very familiar with Mr. Moyes. Mr. Moyes had worked at 
the Weber State Crime Lab for quite some time and had been qualified by and used as 
an expert by the Weber County Attorney's Staff on many occasions.(Tr. Vol. 2 P. 
. 196). 
Rather than inquire as to qualification the prosecutor used the Voir dire inquiry 
to attack Mr. Moyes with vicious unsupported accusations. These accusations were 
denied by Mr. Moyes and the prosecution never attempted to put on any evidence in 
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support of these allegations. A portion of the transcript setting forth the dialogue 
between the prosecutor and Mr. Moyes is incorporated herein under ADDENDUM 
"A". 
Statement of facts 
Reliability of Carleen's Testimony 
In support of defendant's contention that the reliability aspect of Carleen's 
testimony cannot support the conviction herein we incorporate ADDENDUM "B". 
This addendum contains exerts of the examination and cross-examination of Carleen. 
A good portion of her testimony was unresponsive to the questions asked. The 
addendum is not all inclusive but is representative of her testimony. 
Statement of facts 
Verla Hess 
The defendant's only explanation for Carleen to make the statements she made 
was that Carleen was coached to say those things by her mother as a result of her 
mother being angry at the defendant for leaving her. The defense attempted to show 
through various hand written letters and typewritten letters what an angry vindictive 
person Verla Hess had become in this case and how she had expressed her anger and 
vindictiveness at other times with other people through vicious letters. Specifically 
the defense subpoena for her former live-in boy friend and her former husband along 
with Mr. Moyes to examine the questioned documents. 
The defense had a special pre-trial hearing in an attempt to get Ms. Hess' 
typewriter so that Mr. Moyes could compare the type with documents we intended to 
offer in evidence. A transcript of that hearing is a part of the court record (R. 41-61). 
Defense also attempted to get the typewriter in a way that Ms. Hess could not change 
the carbon ribbon. 
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At the hearing Ms. Hess was reluctant to let someone go get the typewriter, 
which she claimed was in Huntington, Utah (R. 055). Even to the point that the court 
said, "Why do you object to somebody going down and picking it up now?" (R.055) 
She said she didn't have her niece's address or phone number to give to us at that time 
but she would get it to Mr. Daroczi (R. 056-05 7). The defense had arranged for a 
former police officer to go pick the typewriter up with the consent of the 
prosecutor,(R. 058) and after considerable negotiating Ms. Hess said "I won't touch 
it."(R.058). This hearing was on October 19, 1995 (Thursday) and Ms. Hess said the 
information on where to pick it up would be in Mr. Daroczi's hands that day. (R. 05 7) 
Ms. Hess in fact delivered the typewriter herself to the County Attorney's 
office on Monday the 23 rd of October, with a new carbon ribbon and a new printing 
wheel on it. She did provide another printing wheel that she said was the original. Her 
only explanation for bringing the typewriter in herself the following Monday was 
ccWhen I left here, it was my understanding that I was to pick up the typewriter and 
bring it to Les." 
Ms. Hess further testified that her niece had the typewriter since May of 1995 
(Tr.Vol 1 P. 83). But when her own son testified on rebuttal that Ms. Hess typed a 
resume for him "around July."(Tr. Vol. 3 P. 45) 
When she testified the first day of trial she couldn't tell the court the address of 
phone number of her niece but said she would provide it immediately. She had not 
provided the information at the end on the second day of trial and the court ordered 
the State to have her there the next morning. 
Mr. Moyes was able to testify the hand printed statement that Ms. Hess wrote 
to the police and admitted to, (Ex D-14) was written by the same person that wrote 
the two pages to Barbara Adams (Ex D-15). He had a very strong opinion they were 
written by the same person.(Tr. Vol. 2 P.225-228). Ms. Hess denied writing the letter 
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to Barbara Adams. (Tr. Vol. 1 P 81) The court admitted the letter to Barbara Adams 
on the basis that it showed bias. (Tr. Vol2 P.226). 
There were various other vicious letters written anonymously that the defense 
attempted to identify as having been written by Ms. Hess (Tr. Vol. 1 P. 82, 84, 
85).The defense also called Stan Spatig, the former boyfriend of Ms. Hess, and was 
prepared to call Bill Monson, her former husband for the purpose of Ms. Hess'prior 
conduct of vicious letter writing, but as a result of the court's ruling as related to 
POINT IV of this brief we were not able to pursue this line of questioning in an 
attempt to prove that she was not telling the truth. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
It was prejudicial error for the prosecutor to use a voir dire request to harass, 
embarrass and make unfounded and unsupported accusations against the defense's 
expert witness and to make no attempt to provide any evidence to support those 
accusations during the State's rebuttal. 
POINT H 
Reasonable minds would not have convicted the defendant on the testimony of 
Carleen Hess and there was no other direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. 
POINT HI 
The court committed error in not granting the defendant's motion to dismiss at 
the end of the State's case. The only direct evidence was the testimony of Carleen 
Hess and her testimony was self-contradictory, non-responsive, and she acknowledged 
being coached by her mother. 
POINT IV 
The court committed error by insisting that under Rule 806 U.R.E. the 
defendant could not use extrinsic evidence to examine the prior conduct of 
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Verla Hess, contrary to the defense's reading of State v Hackford 737 P.2d 200 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: IT WAS DETRIMENTAL PROSECUTOR 
MISCONDUCT TO USE A VOIR DIRE REQUEST TO 
ATTACK AN EXPERT WITNESS WITH UNFOUNDED 
ALLEGATIONS AND NOT OFFER ANY EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE DENIED ACCUSATIONS 
The prosecutor started his voir dire by letting the jury know he was personally 
acquainted with Mr. Moyes and had had a prior working relationship with him as an 
expert witness for the State. The prosecutor also brought out that The Weber State 
Crime Lab was investigated by County Attorney's office and even brought the 
investigator, Mr. Rob Carpenter into the courtroom as a form of attempted 
intimidation. (Addendum "A") The defendant contends this was done in an attempt 
to impress upon the jury personal knowledge and or evidence possessed by the 
prosecutor. This type of conduct is prejudicial and is prohibited under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct: Rule 3.4 (e), as follows; 
"A lawyer shall not: (e) In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does 
not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by the 
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when 
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of 
a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant of 
innocence of an accused;" 
This issue was discussed at some length by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in the 
case of Hawaii v. Rulona, 785 P.2d 615 (1990). In Rulona the prosecutor had had an 
out of court conversation with the defendant and in court posed questions to the 
defendant that "made those questions an assertion of the prosecutrix' personal 
knowledge of the facts in issue with respect to that conversation." (at 618). The 
Hawaii Supreme Court held this was error and the trial court should have stopped the 
prejudicial line of examination, (at 618) Also in discussing the issue the Hawaii Court 
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relied on the long standing decision of the U. S Supreme Court in Berger v United 
States. 295 U. S 78, 55 S.Ct 629,79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). 
In his testimony Mr. Moyes denied: (a) resigning as a result of an investigation; 
(b) that an investigation shut down the crime lab; (c) denied that he resigned in lieu of 
being fired; (d) denied that he flunked a course given by George Throckmorton; (e) 
denied being biased against the County Attorney's Office; (f) denied misstating if he 
examined certain evidence; and (g) denied having ever talked with Mr. Carpenter 
about the investigation. (Addendum "A") 
These questions were a blatant act to embarrass the witness and the prosecutor 
never offered one bit of evidence in rebuttal to dispute Mr. Moyes' denials. The 
prosecutor even went to far as to infer that Mr. Moyes submitted an false resume by 
saying he had worked for the "Secret Service, Executive Protective Service," when 
that is exactly who he worked for. The resume he talked about was another example 
of the prosecutor showing the jury personal knowledge since it was never mentioned 
by the defense nor was it offered in evidence. 
This also is a violation of Rule 4.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct which 
state as follows: 
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden 
a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate 
the legal rights of such a person." 
In dealing with this type of conduct the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Oklahoma in Tobler v. State 688 P.2d 350 (1984), held that the prosecutor exceeded 
the scope of propriety as follows: 
"Moreover, the behavior of the prosecutor in this case exceeded 
the guidelines in The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Sec. 3-5, 
7(a)(d) (1980): 
'(a) The interrogation of all witnesses should be 
conducted fairly, objectively, and with the due 
regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy of the 
witness, and without seeking to intimidate or 
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humiliate the witness unnecessarily. Proper cross-
examination can be conducted without violating rules 
of decorum. 
(d) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to ask 
a question which implies the existence of a actual predicate 
for which a good faith belief is lacking." 
In State v Ballantyne 623 P.2d 857 (Ariz. App. 1986) the Court ruled in the 
following language: 
"Second, the questioning and the tattoo display were reversible 
errors because they amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. To 
ask a question which implies the existence of a prejudicial 
factual predicate which the examiner cannot support by evidence is 
unprofessional conduct and should not be condoned. State 
v. Holsinger, supra. The record shows that the prosecutor 
offered no evidence to controvert either appellant's denial that 
he was a Hell's Angel or his assertion that his tattoo was not 
one commonly worn by the gang members. We assume he 
could not support this insinuation with evidence." 
(at 860) 
The position of the Court of Appeals of Washington as set-forth in State v 
Heath 792 P.2d 558 (Wash. App. 1990) is recited at page 564: 
"Similarly, we believe that a prosecutor has a duty to avoid 
asking questions that will not yield an impeaching response, 
merely in hope of getting an inflammatory statement before 
the jury. See State v. Yoakum,37 Wash 2d 137, 222 P.2d 
181 (1950)" 
Although trial counsel objected on 3 occasions to Mr. Daroczi's questions (Tr. 
Vol.2 P. 200, 206, 206) the real problem was that the prosecutor had until the end of 
his rebuttal the right and the duty to put in evidence to support his accusations. He 
did in fact call three rebuttal witnesses but none addressed Mr. Moyes' testimony. 
Trial counsel, in closing argument, made a point of the fact that no evidence 
was offered in rebuttal to support the State's accusations, which Mr. Daroczi replied 
in his closing rebuttal as follows. 
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"And that we attacked their expert witness, Moyes. Well, ladies 
and gentlemen, he called that witness—and I don't know if he would 
call him again— but he called that witness. He had to live with 
that witness's— or that so-called expert's weaknesses, it anything. 
He says, why didn't we put on testimony afterwards? Because, I 
think you'll remember, he admitted to most of those irregularities he 
was charged with. Oh, yes, well, there was a time that I compared 
the two fingerprint cards and I said they didn't match when they did, 
and so on and so on. And his resume he puts down jobs where he 
was a gate guard. 
Don't get me wrong, I had to do it. I felt sorry for him, and I don't 
know, maybe you did, too. He was Pitiful. But when a witness takes 
that stand, that's the hot seat. That's the hot seat. You better 
be prepared to face uncomfortable questions." 
(Tr. Vol. 3 P.96-97). 
When the prosecutor says Mr. Moyes admitted to most of the irregularities it 
was just plain wrong. And the one incident he referred to as an admission a situation 
where Mr. Moyes gave the following answer to the prosecutors accusation of 
screwing up. 
A. "I — I don't. I do remember a case where I issued an opinion 
and then after some photographs were presented to me, 
enlargements, in the laboratory, I did observe that there was, in 
in fact, a match. But I don't recall that I ever was in court and 
testified about a case like that." 
Although objections were made to the prosecutors "Voir dire" it should be 
noted that the real problem with his accusations was that he did not attempt to support 
them with evidence. In this reqard we submit the position of the Washington 
Appellate Division in State v Babich 842 P.2d 1053 (Wash. App. 1993). 
"The State counters Ms. Babich waived any error when she 
did not object to the prosecutor's cross examination of Mr. 
Franco and Ms. Maldonado and did not request a curative 
instruction in response to the prosecutor's closing argument. 
But in this situation, failure to object is not a waiver. It was not 
the questions themselves that were improper; it was the failure 
to prove the statements in rebuttal that was error. Until 
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the State rested its rebuttal, Ms. Babich had no way of knowing 
whether the State would or would not prove the prior 
statements. By that time it was too late to undo the prejudice 
resulting from the prosecutor citing those prior statements in 
questions heard by the jury." 
POINT H: A CONVICTION CANNOT STAND BASED 
ON THE TESTIMONY OF CARLEEN HESS AND SHE 
WAS THE ONLY WITNESS TO GIVE DIRECT EVIDENCE 
OF AN OFFENSE. 
The only persons to testify during the presentation of the State's case were; 
Verla Hess, mother of Carleen Hess, Dr. Larry Orme Smithing, Carleen Hess (Claimed 
Victim), Ricky D Hawks, and Willard De Hart. (Tr. Vol. 1&2 Index). 
Dr. Smiting was actually a defense witness called out of order by stipulation of 
the parties. 
Ricky D. Hawks is a psychologist at Weber Human Services (Tr. V.2 p. 97) . 
Mr. Hawks saw Carleen twice on May 8th and May 12th and his primary 
function in the trial was to testify as to Carleen's mental age. He did not have any 
direct evidence about the alleged offense. His only knowledge of the allegation was 
what he was told by Carleen and Verla Hess. 
Verla Hess and Officer Wilford De Hart, likewise had no direct evidence of the 
alleged offense. Any information they had was also provided by Carleen. 
Although Carleen may have been legally competent to testify pursuant to Rule 
601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which states "Every person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules," her testimony standing alone is 
not as a matter of law sufficient to support a conviction. 
When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the verdict the standard of review are set forth in State v Hamilton 827 
P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) as follows: 
"[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
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reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence so viewed 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." (at 236) 
" We also note that although a jury can convict only upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the 
charged crime, on appeal, we need not be convinced in our 
own minds beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather we must 
uphold the jury verdict unless reasonable minds could not 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed the crime, (at 236, Note 1) 
Addendum CCB" incorporates selected portions of the testimony of Carieen 
Hess. Her entire testimony only takes about 40 pages.(Vol 2 P.56-97) We submit this 
point of appeal based upon that testimony and would respectfully request this court to 
read her testimony in its entirety. 
This Court may reassess Carleen's testimony pursuant to State v workman 852 
P.2d 981, (Utah 1993) (at 984): 
"Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility 
or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Logan, 563 P. 2d at 813-14. 
In some unusual circumstances, however, a reviewing court may 
reassess witness credibility. For example, 'testimony which is 
inherently improbable may be disregarded,... but to warrant 
such action there must exist either a physical impossibility of the 
evidence being true, or its falsity must be apparent, without 
any resort to inferences or deductions." 
POINT ffl: THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AT THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE'S 
CASE. 
At the end of the State's case the jury was escorted from the courtroom and 
the defendant moved the court to dismiss both charges. This motion was made on the 
grounds that the only direct evidence of a crime was based on the testimony of Carieen 
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Hess and in light of her mental condition, her inability to understand, and her 
unresponsiveness to the questions asked of her, the evidence before the court could 
not justify going ahead. (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 174-175) 
In addition to the problems with Carleen's testimony as noted in the preceding 
paragraph she did acknowledge being told how to act by her mother and 
acknowledged being told what to say. (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 81) 
The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss. (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 175) 
The standard of review for a Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of the State's 
case is set forth in State v. Smith 675 P.2d 521 (Utah 1983), to-wit: 
"Rule 17(o) merely recites the traditional rule that a trial 
judge may dismiss an information or indictment, or any 
count of an information or indictment, either at the close 
of the State's evidence or at the conclusion of all evidence. 
If the State's evidence at the close its case in chief does not 
establish a prima facie case against the defendant, the court 
must, as required by Rule 17(o), dismiss the charge." 
(at 524) 
Actually Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not use the 
term ccPrima Facie". The actual language of Rule 17(o) is as follows: 
"At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count fhereof, upon 
the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the 
offense charged therein or any lesser included offense." 
(Emphasis added) 
In Godesky v Provo City Corp 690 P.2d 541, (Utah 1984) the term Prima 
Facie was defined by the Utah Supreme Court as follows. 
ccPrima facie evidence does not establish a presumption; 
it merely meets the minimum quantum of evidence necessary 
for a party to prevail if the evidence remains unrebutted." 
It may be insignificant semantics to distinguish between "Prima facie" and 
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"legally sufficient" but I have found nothing that says a judge must accept testimony 
on its face in making such a determination. In other words can a portion of a witness's 
testimony rebut another portion of her testimony. 
This point of appeal relates to the same factual situation as Point I I , in that the 
only evidence before the trial judge of any significance at the time the State rested its 
case was the testimony of Carleen Hess. That testimony was so foil of uncertainties, 
unresponsive answers, and acknowledgments that she was coached by her mother that 
her testimony cannot be considered legally sufficient to get past a Motion to Dismiss. 
The Appellate Courts in Utah can reassess witness credibility pursuant to 
State v Workman (Supra at 984) so a trial judge certainly can and should in 
connection with a Motion to Dismiss. 
POINT IV: THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN NOT ALLOWING CERTAIN LETTERS AND 
TESTIMONY ON THE BASIS THAT IT WAS NOT 
PERMITTED UNDER RULE 608 
The defense attempted to show that the conduct of Verla Hess against the 
defendant was consistent with her conduct in prior relationships with Stan Spatig and 
her former husband Bill Monson. We did not contend that she accused or had them 
accused of sex offenses but her prior conduct of vicious anonymous letter writing and 
similar acts was consistent with things happening to the defendant. 
The court ruled that we could not go into extrinsic evidence to attack the 
witnesses credibility. The arguments and proffer on this issue are set out in Pages 177 
to 181 of Vol. 2 of the trial transcript. The courts ultimate ruling is on page 181 and 
reads as follows: 
"THE COURT: And your trying to show her character by a pattern 
of conduct which you cannot prove by extrinsic evidence." 
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The defense contends that the Statement of Facts — Verla Hess, as set forth in 
this brief give a sufficient foundation of her untruthfulness as to justify showing prior 
conduct through extrinsic evidence, in accordance with State v Hackford 737 P.2d 
200 (Utah 1987) where in the Supreme Court said: 
"The inapplicability of Rule 608(b) is relatively clear from its text 
and is confirmed by the cases discussed above. But if there is 
any question on the matter, we need only look to Rule 608(c), 
which, to our knowledge, is unique to Utah. That rule makes 
explicit what is otherwise implicit in 608(b).It states. "Bias, 
prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach 
the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence 
otherwise adduced.' Plainly, Rule 608(c) is the rule under which 
the propriety of the cross-examination of Lane should have been 
considered." 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant contends that this court should rule in his favor on Points 2 and 
3 and Order the lower court to dismiss the charge against him. In the alternative the 
defendant requests that the court rule in his favor on points 1 and 4 which should 
result in the granting of a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th~d^ of October, 1996. 
H. DONSHARP ^ — 
Attorney or appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
PORTIONS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN MR. MOYES 
AND THE PROSECUTOR. 
Each of the following series of quotations is followed by the reference 
to the Volume and page of the trial transcript. 
Q £CMr. Moyes, we know each other, do we not?" 
A "We do." 
Q "Over the years, we were on first-name basis?" 
A "Yes." 
Q "And now your on the other side for the first time." 
A "No, that's not-" 
Q ccWell, I mean, as for as I'm concerned." 
A "Yes "(Vol. 2 P. 196) 
Q "Didn't you , in fact, resign as a result of an investigation into the— into the 
practices and procedures at the Weber State Crime Lab?" 
A "No." 
Q "Which resulted in the shutdown of the Crime Lab." 
A "No." (Vol 2. P 197) 
Q "Isn't it a fact that you were offered to resign in lieu of being fired." 
A "No." 
Q "As a result of that?" 
A "No, that's not the case."(Vol. 2 P. 197) 
Q "All right, sir. When you put down prior employment, 1970 to 1974, U.S. 
Secret Service, Executive Protective Service, isn't it a fact that you were a 
gate guard there?" 
A "I was a member of the Executive Protective Service. That is the Uniform 
Division of the Secret Service." 
Q "You were a gate guard?" 
A "You can-yes."(Vol. 2 P. 198) 
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Q "You mentioned George Throckmorton as a — as the one certified document-
examiner, an expert--" 
A "Yes." 
Q "-- in the State of Utah. Isn't it a fact that you flunked a course that was given 
by this one certified examiner." 
A "No sir." (Vol.2 P. 199) 
Q "As a matter of fact, you're — well, to put it mildly, you're biased against my 
office, the County Attorney's Office. You have an ax to grind.." 
A "I wouldn't say so." 
Q "Isn't it a fact that an investigator from the County Attorney's Office, Rob 
Carpenter, the fellow leaning on his — well, he just took his hand off his shiny 
head there." 
A "I know Mr. Carpenter." 
Q "Isn't it a fact that he's the one that conducted the investigation that led to 
your resigning?" 
A "I understand he was involved in the investigation, yes." 
Q "An investigation of your— specifically, more your practices and procedures?" 
A "Since I never talked to Mr. Carpenter, I wouldn't know exactly what he was 
investigating." (Vol. 2 P.205) 
Q "And do you remember the incident where you claimed to have analyzed 
evidence that turned out— you admitted that, afterward, that you did not, in 
fact, analyze evidence when confronted with the facts." 
A "I remember the case and I remember being asked about that, but I don't 
recall that there wasn't evidence that I didn't examine." (Vol. 2 P.209) 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
SELECT PORTIONS OF THE EXAMINATION AND 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF CARLEEN HESS 
The following quotes were extracted from the trial transcript as it related to the 
testimony of Carleen in both her direct and cross examination and as it relates to her 
ability to understand, and provide reliable answers; 
Q "Have you lived there a long time or a short time?" 
A "Yes, I have." (Vol. 2 P.58) 
Q "Do you know why he moved out?" (This refers to Defendant) 
A "I don't know." (Vol. 2 P62) 
Q "Oh, like play nasty with what or how? What part of your body?" 
A "My Dick." (Vol. 2 P.63-64) 
Q "All right. What else? And what else would he do to you besides playing with 
our tits?" 
A "he fucked me." 
Q tcHe would fuck you ?" 
A "Yes" 
Q "Okey" 
A "He did" 
Q "and — and how would he do that? What part of his body? What did he use to 
fuck you? How would he do this?" 
A "Up front" 
Q "Up front. And you're showing your — your part — what do you call that part 
of your body that you were just showing us?" 
A "My titties."(Vol. 2 P. 64-65) 
Q "Okey. And — and did he just put it outside or inside?" 
A "Inside." 
Q "Inside. Okey. How did that feel?" 
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A "I don't know "(Vol 2 P. 65-66) 
Q "Do you remember when you told your mom?" 
A "yes, I did." 
Q "Was Wayne there when you told your mom?" 
A "Yes, I did. He was There." (Vol. 2 P 70) (According to the mother he was 
notthere)(Vol.lP. 49) 
Q "Yeah. You've talked about what your going to say today." 
A "Everything." 
Q "Everything. And who — you've talked with Les about it, haven't you?" 
A "Yes I have." 
Q "And your mom's told you how you should act in court and what you should 
say and everything else, hasn't she?" 
A "Yes" 
Q "And you do what your mom tells you, don't you?" 
A "Yes" 
Q "Because your mom doesn't lie to you, does she?" 
A "No, she doesn't" 
Q "So your mom tells you what to say--" 
A "Yeah" 
Q "— and that's what you say, right?" 
A "Yeah, she did." (Vol. 2 P 81) 
Q "Do you remember me asking you what fuck meant? Do you remember that or 
not?" 
A "Yes, I have." 
Q "Yes, you have. Do you remember telling me at that time that you don't know 
what it means?" 
A "Yes" (Vol 2 P 83) 
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There are multitudes of inconsistencies and unresponsive answers in Carleen's 
testimony which is included in Vol 2 pages 56 to 97. The exerts set forth above are 
not intended to be all inclusive but simply examples. 
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